{"id":401581,"date":"2024-10-30T19:39:14","date_gmt":"2024-10-30T18:39:14","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.eunews.it\/2024\/10\/30\/ue-serbia-georgia-turchia-russia\/"},"modified":"2024-11-06T15:05:57","modified_gmt":"2024-11-06T14:05:57","slug":"eu-enlargement-3-when-moscow-is-too-close-obstacles-to-the-accession-of-georgia-serbia-and-turkey","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.eunews.it\/en\/2024\/10\/30\/eu-enlargement-3-when-moscow-is-too-close-obstacles-to-the-accession-of-georgia-serbia-and-turkey\/","title":{"rendered":"EU Enlargement -3\/ When Moscow is too close: obstacles to the accession of Georgia, Serbia, and Turkey"},"content":{"rendered":"<p class=\"p1\">Brussels &#8211; Among the c<strong>andidate countries for European Union membership<\/strong>, three currently seem rather far away. They are <strong>Georgia<\/strong>, <strong>Serbia,<\/strong> and <strong>Turkey<\/strong>. Each of them has various critical issues on different levels. However,\u00a0one thing that Tbilisi, Belgrade, and Ankara have in common is their <strong>disconnection from Brussels<\/strong> on one key issue:\u00a0<strong>foreign and security policy,<\/strong>\u00a0which, since the aggression of Ukraine two and a half years ago, includes the imperative to <strong>not align with Vladimir Putin&#8217;s Russia<\/strong>.<\/p>\n<h3 id='serbia-achilles-heel-of-the-balkans'  id=\"boomdevs_1\" class=\"p1\">Serbia, Achilles&#8217; heel of the Balkans<\/h3>\n<p class=\"p1\">Of the six candidate countries in the Balkan region, <strong>Serbia<\/strong> (which applied for membership in 2012) is definitely the most problematic in terms\u00a0of<strong> misalignment with the strategic priorities of EU foreign policy<\/strong>. In its annual report on the progress of the accession process (also called the <strong>enlargement package<\/strong>), presented Wednesday (Oct. 30) by the High Representative for Foreign Policy <strong>Josep Borrell<\/strong> and Enlargement and Neighborhood Commissioner <strong>Oliv\u00e9r V\u00e1rhelyi<\/strong>, <a href=\"https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/commission\/presscorner\/detail\/en\/ip_24_5583\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">states:<\/a> \u00a0&#8220;The pace of negotiations&#8221; for Belgrade&#8217;s entry into the European club &#8220;will continue to depend on <strong>reforms on the rule of law<\/strong> and the <strong>normalization of Serbia&#8217;s relations with Kosovo<\/strong>.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p class=\"p1\">Regarding the first point, the reforms on which the Balkan country needs to focus mainly on\u00a0the\u00a0<strong>freedom of civil society and the media<\/strong> and the <strong>fight against disinformation and interference from abroad<\/strong>. Translated: it must\u00a0<strong>reduce exposure to the Kremlin&#8217;s hybrid campaigns<\/strong>, which grip this state more than others in the region.<\/p>\n<p class=\"p1\">However, the\u00a0<strong>complex relationship with Kosovo<\/strong>\u00a0is the main point influencing Serbia&#8217;s European prospects. Belgrade has <strong>never recognized Pristina<\/strong>&#8216;s independence (proclaimed unilaterally in 2008 and recognized by more than half of UN member states), and the dialogue between the two nations &#8211; <a href=\"https:\/\/www.eunews.it\/en\/2024\/06\/25\/new-borrell-kurti-vucic-trilateral-summit-in-brussels-to-revive-dialogue-between-serbia-and-kosovo\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">facilitated by the EU<\/a> &#8211; is not making significant progress,\u00a0an understatement, given the <strong>moments of acute crisis<\/strong> in recent times (e.g., the <strong>dispute over Albanian license plates<\/strong> that later resulted in the bloody episode at the <strong>Banjska Monastery<\/strong> in September 2023). For that matter, the Serbian government led by <strong>Milo\u0161 Vu\u010devi\u0107<\/strong> <a href=\"https:\/\/www.eunews.it\/en\/2024\/05\/03\/new-serbian-government-sparks-controversy-with-pro-russian-figures-sanctioned-by-us\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">reiterated<\/a> that it intends to continue on the line of non-recognition of what it considers <strong>a part of the national territory<\/strong>.<\/p>\n<p class=\"p1\">A parallel concern for\u00a0Brussels is Belgrade&#8217;s <strong>closeness to Moscow<\/strong>, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.eunews.it\/en\/2024\/09\/05\/eu-warns-serbia-aligning-with-russia-contrary-to-stated-goal-of-membership\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">another issue<\/a>\u00a0for Vu\u010devi\u0107&#8217;s executive (but also previous ones), which includes <strong>two politicians sanctioned by the United States<\/strong> for their ties to Vladimir Putin&#8217;s Russia: former intelligence chief <strong>Aleksandar Vulin<\/strong> and businessman <strong>Nenand Popovi\u0107<\/strong>. The EU executive <a href=\"https:\/\/neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu\/serbia-report-2024_en\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">underlines that<\/a> Serbia &#8220;<strong>has not yet aligned with the restrictive measures<\/strong>&#8221; adopted by the EU &#8220;against the Russian Federation&#8221; and other countries such as Belarus, North Korea, and Iran and &#8220;has not aligned with most of the <strong>statements of the High Representative<\/strong>&#8221; directed at the Kremlin. In addition to this, Belgrade &#8220;maintained <strong>high-level relations<\/strong>&#8221; with Moscow and &#8220;intensified&#8221; those with Beijing, &#8220;raising doubts about Serbia&#8217;s strategic direction,&#8221;\u00a0the report continued.<\/p>\n<h3 id='georgia-a-country-in-the-balance'  id=\"boomdevs_2\" class=\"p1\">Georgia, a country in the balance<\/h3>\n<p class=\"p1\">Another candidate state that is <strong>dangerously leaning toward Moscow<\/strong> is <strong>Georgia<\/strong>. Although its population is strongly pro-Western, the government &#8211; since 2012 firmly in the hands of <strong>Georgian Dream<\/strong>, the party of\u00a0oligarch <strong>Bidzina Ivanishvili\u00a0<\/strong>&#8211; has over the past year <strong>increasingly taken pro-Russian positions<\/strong>, forcing, moreover, the parliamentary passage of <strong>two<\/strong>\u00a0<strong>repressive\u00a0measures<\/strong> (a law on &#8220;foreign agents&#8221; and one on the family that discriminates against members of the LGBTQ+ community) modeled along\u00a0the example of similar Russian legislation, which prompted <strong>the freezing <\/strong>of\u00a0Tbilisi<strong> EU rapprochement path<\/strong> (launched in 2022) and the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.eunews.it\/en\/2024\/07\/09\/eu-suspension-georgia-government-funds\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">suspension of disbursement<\/a> of EU funds.<\/p>\n<p class=\"p1\">The situation did\u00a0not improved\u00a0with the <strong>last round of elections<\/strong>\u00a0on Saturday (Oct. 26), during which local and international observers <a href=\"https:\/\/www.eunews.it\/en\/2024\/10\/29\/chaos-in-georgia-the-country-is-on-the-brink-of-crisis-after-elections-with-strong-suspicions-of-fraud\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">reported<\/a> a <strong>long series of irregularities and violations<\/strong> and which the opposition parties have pledged not to acknowledge, refusing to take office in the new parliament. According to the President of the Republic, <strong>Salom\u00e9 Zourabichvili<\/strong>, the elections were &#8220;stolen&#8221; from Georgians by &#8220;<strong>a Russian intelligence operation<\/strong>,&#8221; and even in Brussels, there are fears that the outcome of the vote could push the small Caucasian state <strong>towards Moscow&#8217;s orbit<\/strong> in an irreparable way.<\/p>\n<p class=\"p1\">According to the European Commission&#8217;s <a href=\"https:\/\/neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu\/georgia-report-2024_en\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">analysis<\/a>, &#8220;the <strong>rate of alignment with EU foreign<\/strong> and security policy remains <strong>considerably low<\/strong>,&#8221; even though Tbilisi has &#8220;cooperated with the EU to <strong>prevent the circumvention of sanctions<\/strong>&#8221; imposed on the Russian Federation.\u00a0However, this cooperation may come to an end shortly.<\/p>\n<h3 id='the-eternal-limbo-of-turkey'  id=\"boomdevs_3\" class=\"p1\">The eternal limbo of Turkey<\/h3>\n<p class=\"p1\">Turkey&#8217;s hopes of joining the EU also remain decidedly slim: the Anatolian country applied for membership back in 1999 but, for a long series of reasons, has <strong>never had a concrete prospect<\/strong> of joining the 12-star club, and now its file has been stalled since 2018. Among the most significant\u00a0obstacles are the <strong>Cypriot question<\/strong>, disputes with Greece over <strong>control of certain sea stretches<\/strong> (and underlying hydrocarbon deposits) in the eastern Mediterranean, respect for the <strong>rule of law<\/strong> and <strong>fundamental rights<\/strong> (including those of minorities and women), and, again, the <strong>disconnect in foreign policy between Ankara and Brussels<\/strong>.<\/p>\n<p class=\"p1\">Under the presidency of <strong>Recep Tayyip Erdo\u011fan<\/strong>, Turkey has moved relatively casually (critics would say recklessly) on the international stage, establishing an <strong>ambivalent relationship with Putin&#8217;s Russia<\/strong>. On some crisis fronts, such as the Syrian one, the two leaders have found themselves on <strong>opposing\u00a0sides. <\/strong>However,\u00a0<strong>the two countries are\u00a0closely linked<\/strong> by a growing relationship that spans the <strong>political plane<\/strong> (Ankara is reportedly aspiring to join the BRICS, which the Moscow strongman calls the global alternative to the West), <strong>strategic<\/strong> (from Africa to Ukraine via the Caucasus), <strong>economic<\/strong> (with increasing trade flows), and <strong>energy<\/strong> (Turkey appears to be aiming to become the hub for bringing Russian gas into Europe at a time when sanctions prevent EU states from sourcing directly from the Federation).<\/p>\n<p class=\"p1\">The EU executive<a href=\"https:\/\/neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu\/turkiye-report-2024_en\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">\u00a0reiterates<\/a> that Ankara &#8220;<strong>has refused to align itself with the EU&#8217;s restrictive measures<\/strong> against Russia regarding Russia&#8217;s aggression of Ukraine&#8221; and suggests that Turkey should <strong>step up\u00a0efforts to reduce sanction circumvention<\/strong> of goods bound for the Federation by preventing the &#8220;<strong>false transit<\/strong>&#8221; of high priority\u00a0items through its territory. The Anatolian Republic should also &#8220;<strong>cooperate more actively with EU investigating authorities<\/strong> on cases of falsification of origin of sanctioned goods from Russia illegally entering the single market&#8221; of the 27 member states. In Borrell&#8217;s words, the alignment between EU and Turkish foreign policy is &#8220;<strong>particularly low and declining<\/strong>.&#8221;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Three of the nine candidate countries for entry into the European club are still too far removed from Brussels when it comes to foreign policy. Over all the three, albeit with different nuances, looms the shadows of Vladimir Putin&#8217;s Russia<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":7876,"featured_media":401515,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"episode_type":"","audio_file":"","podmotor_file_id":"","podmotor_episode_id":"","cover_image":"","cover_image_id":"","duration":"","filesize":"","filesize_raw":"","date_recorded":"","explicit":"","block":"","jnews-multi-image_gallery":[],"jnews_single_post":{"source_name":"","source_url":"","via_name":"","via_url":"","override_template":"0","override":[{"template":"1","single_blog_custom":"","parallax":"1","fullscreen":"1","layout":"right-sidebar","sidebar":"default-sidebar","second_sidebar":"default-sidebar","sticky_sidebar":"1","share_position":"top","share_float_style":"share-monocrhome","show_share_counter":"0","show_view_counter":"0","show_featured":"1","show_post_meta":"1","show_post_author":"1","show_post_author_image":"1","show_post_date":"1","post_date_format":"default","post_date_format_custom":"Y\/m\/d","show_post_category":"1","show_post_reading_time":"0","post_reading_time_wpm":"300","post_calculate_word_method":"str_word_count","show_zoom_button":"0","zoom_button_out_step":"2","zoom_button_in_step":"3","show_post_tag":"1","show_prev_next_post":"1","show_popup_post":"1","number_popup_post":"1","show_author_box":"0","show_post_related":"1","show_inline_post_related":"0"}],"override_image_size":"0","image_override":[{"single_post_thumbnail_size":"crop-500","single_post_gallery_size":"crop-500"}],"trending_post":"0","trending_post_position":"meta","trending_post_label":"Trending","sponsored_post":"0","sponsored_post_label":"Sponsored by","sponsored_post_name":"","sponsored_post_url":"","sponsored_post_logo_enable":"0","sponsored_post_logo":"","sponsored_post_desc":"","disable_ad":"0"},"jnews_primary_category":{"id":"","hide":""},"jnews_override_counter":{"override_view_counter":"0","view_counter_number":"0","override_share_counter":"0","share_counter_number":"0","override_like_counter":"0","like_counter_number":"0","override_dislike_counter":"0","dislike_counter_number":"0"},"footnotes":""},"categories":[25707],"tags":[26458,29494,27879,25836,27451,25792,27759,29544,25803,26071,26746],"class_list":["post-401581","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-world-politics","tag-bidzina-ivanishvili-en","tag-politics-abroad-and-security-common-en","tag-eu-enlargement-en","tag-georgia-and","tag-josep-borrell-en","tag-milos-vucevic-en","tag-recep-tayyp-erdogan-en","tag-russia-in-2","tag-inserbia","tag-turkey-en-2"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.eunews.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/401581","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.eunews.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.eunews.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.eunews.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/7876"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.eunews.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=401581"}],"version-history":[{"count":5,"href":"https:\/\/www.eunews.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/401581\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":401610,"href":"https:\/\/www.eunews.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/401581\/revisions\/401610"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.eunews.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/401515"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.eunews.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=401581"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.eunews.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=401581"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.eunews.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=401581"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}