{"id":418965,"date":"2025-02-18T08:09:16","date_gmt":"2025-02-18T07:09:16","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.eunews.it\/2025\/02\/18\/euds-integrita-elezioni-germania-romania\/"},"modified":"2025-02-18T12:18:23","modified_gmt":"2025-02-18T11:18:23","slug":"when-social-media-puts-election-integrity-at-risk","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.eunews.it\/en\/2025\/02\/18\/when-social-media-puts-election-integrity-at-risk\/","title":{"rendered":"When social media puts election integrity at risk"},"content":{"rendered":"

Brussels – Elections under the EU’s magnifying glass: EU institutions are running for cover to secure democratic processes<\/strong> in the 27 member states\u00a0from malicious interference from abroad<\/strong> (especially Russia). Under notable\u00a0observation are the upcoming legislative elections in Germany<\/strong> and the new round of presidential elections in Romania<\/strong>, given the historic cancellation of the first round last December.<\/p>\n

From the EU perspective, the common thread\u00a0linking these two otherwise distinct consultations is the need to protect its integrity in the face of external threats<\/strong>. Translated: to prevent a foreign power (read: Moscow) from getting in the way.\u00a0It was precisely the theme of a lengthy hearing held yesterday afternoon (Feb. 17) at the Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield (EUDS)<\/strong> in the European Parliament in\u00a0Brussels. Representatives of three national agencies for monitoring electoral processes and online disinformation<\/strong>, the EU executive<\/strong> and the External Action Service (EEAS)<\/strong>, the Union’s Foreign Office, appeared before MEPs.<\/p>\n

The Romania Case<\/h3>\n

Background: in early December, the Romanian Constitutional Court <\/strong>made the unprecedented decision<\/a> to annul the first round of the presidential<\/strong> elections held a few days earlier for\u00a0presumed Kremlin interference<\/strong> in the election campaign, especially on TikTok<\/strong>. The election gave an overwhelming victory to the independent (ultranationalist and pro-Russian) candidate C\u0103lin Georgescu<\/strong>, who had an outsized presence and followers\u00a0on the Chinese platform.<\/p>\n

\"C\u0103lin<\/a>
Ultranationalist and pro-Russian candidate C\u0103lin Georgescu speaks to reporters in the aftermath of his victory in the first round of the Romanian presidential elections, November 26, 2024 (photo: Daniel Mihailescu\/Afp)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

According to judges in Bucharest, however, that vote was to be deemed invalid due to massive outside interference<\/strong>. Thus, Romanians will vote again in the first round on May 4 and possibly in the runoff on the 18th. Meanwhile, the now former president Claus Iohannis<\/strong> resigned<\/a> to avoid impeachment<\/i>\u00a0on\u00a0February 10, exacerbating even more the political-institutional crisis in the Balkan country<\/strong>. In mid-December, the European Commission opened<\/a> an investigation (its third) against TikTok for alleged violations of the Digital Services Act<\/i> (DSA) —<\/strong> the pillar that regulates social networks and online platforms.<\/p>\n

Manipulation and Dark Funding<\/h3>\n

According toa recent report<\/a>\u00a0of VIGINUM\u00a0<\/i><\/strong>(the Service of Vigilance and Protection against Foreign Digital Interference, created in France in 2021), networks of external actors<\/strong> have implemented two malicious strategies<\/strong> in the context of the Romanian presidential elections<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

On the one hand, TikTok<\/strong> algorithms were manipulated<\/strong> for recommending content to users. In essence, hundreds of thousands of authentic and inauthentic interactions<\/strong> (i.e., made by fake accounts, the notorious bots<\/i>, allegedly totaling over 300 thousand) artificially<\/strong> – and in a coordinated manner – “inflated” the relevance of determined topics and content<\/strong>, making them go viral and thus favoring Georgescu.<\/strong><\/p>\n

On the other hand, there has been a widespread\u00a0and opaque operation of funding some 130 influencers<\/strong> (including those with a small-to-medium following) who, consciously or unconsciously, ended up “propagandizing” the positions of the pro-Russian candidate<\/strong>. The absence of transparency about the origin of funding and advertisements<\/strong> allowed the foreign network to move while remaining virtually invisible<\/strong>, directly reaching a gigantic electoral pool.<\/p>\n

\"TikTok\"<\/a>
Photo: Solen Feyissa via Wikimedia Commons<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

When one considers that in Romania,\u00a0TikTok has about 9 million users out of a population of 19 million<\/strong> and that the platform is used as the primary information tool<\/strong> by a substantial portion of this user base, it is clear how the instrumentation of content<\/strong> on this social media outlet may have played a crucial role in tilting the election towards\u00a0Georgescu’s side.<\/p>\n

Also speaking on the Romanian case were members of the Expert Forum<\/i> (EFOR)<\/strong>, a Bucharest-based think tank that, among other things, monitors the spread of disinformation online. In their presentation to the EUDS\u00a0Committee, EFOR experts emphasized that manipulation of this magnitude requires substantial economic resources<\/strong>: an alarm bell should have rung, for example, when Georgescu claimed he had not incurred campaign expenses<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

Another crucial element is the limitations researchers face in accessing the data t<\/strong>hey need to elaborate\u00a0on users’ interactions with platform content<\/strong>. Theoretically, the data should be public, but in practice, it is difficult to retrieve<\/strong>, given the lack of cooperation<\/strong> from the owners of the platforms themselves.<\/p>\n

The elections in Germany<\/h3>\n

The latter critical issue, incidentally, was also recently highlighted in the context of the upcoming elections for the German Bundestag<\/i><\/strong>. In early February, the Berlin District Court demanded that X<\/a>, the social networking site owned by Elon Musk<\/strong>, make “immediately available” to researchers a set of data<\/strong> needed to assess the pre-election environment.<\/p>\n

In Germany, the polls will open on\u00a0Sunday (Feb. 23), and the temperature of public debate has soared<\/a> in recent weeks due to the apparent cross-denomination<\/strong> of the pro-Russian and xenophobic ultra-right of Alternative f\u00fcr Deutschland<\/i> (AfD)<\/strong>. Not only has the ultra-right been adulated repeatedly<\/a>\u00a0by Musk (casting heavy doubts on the reliability of the moderation of political content on X), but it has also been deemed<\/a> an acceptable backing for a parliamentary vote from the Christian Democratic Union (CDU\/CSU)<\/strong>, the\u00a0mainstream<\/em> party that should form the next government.<\/p>\n

\"Alice<\/a>
AfD co-leader Alice Weidel (photo: Michele Tantussi\/Afp)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

A representative of BNetzA<\/strong>, the federal agency responsible for, among other things, monitoring disinformation on the Web,\u00a0reported on the prospects for the integrity of the electoral process in Germany. The recent\u00a0stress test<\/strong> confirmed that Berlin should be able to hold\u00a0elections relatively safely<\/strong>, but again, the problem lies on the side of the platforms.<\/p>\n

While the DSA provides tools<\/strong> described as “quasi-surgical” to address the risks<\/strong> in question, the point is that companies need to explain more transparently<\/strong> to national and EU authorities how their algorithms<\/strong> work, starting with recommendation systems<\/strong> (to date still resembling black boxes), and political advertisements<\/strong> (shedding more light on where funding comes from and how it is used). Beyond that, they must also ensure the timely removal of fake accounts<\/strong> and\u00a0give\u00a0access to data for researchers<\/strong> “before, during, and after elections.”<\/p>\n

The efforts of Brussels<\/h3>\n

Therefore, the main obstacles to effectively countering online disinformation remain full enforcement of regulatory provisions <\/strong>and coordination between national bodies<\/strong> (including intelligence agencies and various governmental structures) and EU bodies<\/strong>. Moreover, representatives of the Community Executive and the EEAS have insisted on cooperation for some time now. The EEAS set up internal structures<\/strong> (like Stratcom<\/a>) to counter so-called FIMI operations<\/a>\u00a0(Foreign Information Manipulation & Interference<\/strong>).<\/p>\n

\"Vladimir<\/a>
Russian president Vladimir Putin (photo via Imagoeconomica)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

The Commission reiterates that the monitoring of elections is of\u00a0national competence.<\/strong> At the European level, what can and does\u00a0exist is a framework for cooperation and coordination among national networks <\/strong>(of which entities such as VIGINUM, EFOR, and BNetzA are a\u00a0part) to support preparation and risk management.<\/strong> Another crucial point is the speed<\/strong> of platforms in providing the data requested <\/strong>by national or community researchers and agencies and of governments in acting promptly during crises or emergencies<\/strong> of various kinds to safeguard the integrity of democratic processes.<\/p>\n

An appropriate response to FIMI actions will likely be increasingly crucial <\/strong>between now and the next few years. Malicious operations from abroad <\/strong>(such as the Doppelganger operation<\/i><\/a>, with which Russia has been attempting to destabilize European states for years) will continue and, indeed, also abetted by the flooding development of artificial intelligence applications<\/strong>, are likely to increase in intensity.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

In the 21st century, protecting election processes also means collaborating with online platforms such as TikTok and X, where malicious foreign actors conduct their manipulation and disinformation campaigns<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":7876,"featured_media":409541,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"episode_type":"","audio_file":"","podmotor_file_id":"","podmotor_episode_id":"","cover_image":"","cover_image_id":"","duration":"","filesize":"","filesize_raw":"","date_recorded":"","explicit":"","block":"","jnews-multi-image_gallery":[],"jnews_single_post":{"format":"standard","override":[{"template":"1","parallax":"1","fullscreen":"1","layout":"right-sidebar","sidebar":"default-sidebar","second_sidebar":"default-sidebar","sticky_sidebar":"1","share_position":"top","share_float_style":"share-monocrhome","show_featured":"1","show_post_meta":"1","show_post_author":"1","show_post_author_image":"1","show_post_date":"1","post_date_format":"default","post_date_format_custom":"Y\/m\/d","show_post_category":"1","show_post_reading_time":"0","post_reading_time_wpm":"300","post_calculate_word_method":"str_word_count","show_zoom_button":"0","zoom_button_out_step":"2","zoom_button_in_step":"3","show_post_tag":"1","show_prev_next_post":"1","show_popup_post":"1","number_popup_post":"1","show_author_box":"0","show_post_related":"1","show_inline_post_related":"0"}],"image_override":[{"single_post_thumbnail_size":"crop-500","single_post_gallery_size":"crop-500"}],"trending_post_position":"meta","trending_post_label":"Trending","sponsored_post_label":"Sponsored by","disable_ad":"0","subtitle":""},"jnews_primary_category":[],"jnews_override_counter":{"view_counter_number":"0","share_counter_number":"0","like_counter_number":"0","dislike_counter_number":"0"},"footnotes":""},"categories":[25681],"tags":[26267,29945,25816,26580,29785,26087,29715,26088,30503,26941,26091],"class_list":["post-418965","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-politics","tag-calin-georgescu-en","tag-dsa-en","tag-election-germany-2025-en","tag-elon-musk-en","tag-presidential-romania-en","tag-tiktok-en","tag-x-en"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.eunews.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/418965","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.eunews.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.eunews.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.eunews.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/7876"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.eunews.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=418965"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/www.eunews.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/418965\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":418996,"href":"https:\/\/www.eunews.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/418965\/revisions\/418996"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.eunews.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/409541"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.eunews.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=418965"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.eunews.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=418965"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.eunews.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=418965"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}