The war in Ukraine has triggered the rearmament of Europe, but that is not all. The Old Continent is once again debating the reintroduction of military service, at least in its voluntary form. However, the issue has proved particularly divisive and is struggling to gain the support of the armed forces, as well as of young people directly affected by the measure.<\/p>\n
Important lessons for European countries that are only beginning to seriously reconsider or redesign their systems of military service can be offered by the Ukrainian experience \u2013 painful, dramatic, and deeply contradictory.<\/p>\n
Russia’s full-scale invasion fundamentally transformed Ukrainian society \u2013 first and foremost, its attitude toward the army, military service, and the very concept of mobilisation. Before 2022, debates about the armed forces largely focused on reforms, NATO-standardisation, and a gradual transition to a professional army. After Russia\u2019s attack, however, military service ceased to be an abstract policy discussion and became a matter of the state\u2019s physical survival.<\/p>\n
The Ukrainian lessons from the war<\/strong><\/p>\n In the early phase of the full-scale invasion, Ukraine’s resistance relied heavily on an unprecedented wave of voluntary mobilisation, with thousands of people with no prior combat experience joining the Armed Forces of Ukraine and territorial defence units. However, as the fourth anniversary of the full-scale invasion approaches, public attitudes have shifted noticeably: today, an increasing number of Ukrainians try to avoid military service and mobilisation. This reluctance to fight is better explained by deep social, economic, and psychological pressures than by a lack of patriotism or any desire to surrender to Russia.<\/p>\n President Volodymyr Zelensky has acknowledged the shortage of personnel in the armed forces. According to him, expanding mobilisation is “a difficult issue for the state, the army, society, and Ukraine’s partners.” Zelensky\u00a0explained<\/a>that the current mobilisation system operates based on decisions made by the military command, which has determined a need to conscript approximately 30,000 people per month. “This is a tough question,” the\u00a0president said. “People in society must work and pay taxes, and then those funds go to the army. A balance has to be found.”<\/p>\n Ukraine\u2019s experience shows that even voluntary mobilisation in wartime has clear limits. Legal frameworks alone are not enough \u2013 motivation, quality training, and long-term social support for service members are equally crucial.\u00a0At the same time, Ukraine continues to debate whether the mobilisation age should be lowered from 25 to 18, as US officials and NATO representatives urge Kyiv to lower the mobilisation age, citing the urgent need for manpower on the front line.<\/p>\n In response, Ukrainian authorities have sought to prioritise incentives over coercion. One such measure is the one-year ‘Contract 18\u201324’, available to men aged 18 to 24. It offers a financial reward of up to \u20ac22,000, access to interest-free mortgages, and an expanded social benefits package. The contract applies exclusively to combat roles \u2014 including infantrymen, grenade launchers, and reconnaissance soldiers \u2014 with training lasting more than 80 days.<\/p>\n The war in Ukraine has also demonstrated that technology can partially compensate for manpower shortages on the battlefield. FPV drones and robotic ground platforms are increasingly used to perform tasks that previously required large numbers of soldiers. Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Oleksandr Syrskyi has described 2025 as a “breakthrough year” for the development of unmanned systems.\u00a0Yet Ukrainian military officials stress that technology cannot fully replace troops on the ground.\u00a0An\u00a0analysis<\/a>\u00a0published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies highlights\u00a0the main reasons \u2013 the complexity of combat tasks and the need for rapid judgment and decision-making in unpredictable conditions.<\/p>\n For European countries considering the return of conscription or expanded voluntary service, Ukraine’s experience offers a clear lesson: even technologies that dramatically enhance combat effectiveness do not eliminate the challenges of motivation, rotation, and the psychological resilience of military personnel.<\/p>\n What happened in Germany<\/strong><\/p>\n Germany was the first country to pass a law introducing voluntary military service. Starting in 2026, approximately 680,000 German citizens born in 2008 or later will receive a questionnaire asking whether they are willing to serve in the military. Men born on or after 1 January 2008 will be required to complete the questionnaire, although service itself remains voluntary. If recruitment targets are not met, however, Parliament may decide to reactivate compulsory military service and introduce a lottery system. On the day the law on voluntary service was passed, thousands of young people took to the streets in at least 90 German cities to protest against what they described as a new call to arms.<\/p>\n Young people\u2019s opposition was evident even before the law was passed. As Michael Schulze von Gla\u00dfer, director of the German Peace Society, explains, visits to the organisation\u2019s website, which provides information on how to refuse military service in the event of conscription, have increased month by month. \u201cIn May, the site had 24,000 visits, and in the first ten days of September alone, 65,000. We receive many requests from young people, but also from parents concerned about their children. Then there are people who have already refused or been discharged and now want to know whether that is sufficient.\u201d<\/p>\n Between France and Italy<\/strong><\/p>\n The situation is very different in France. President Emmanuel Macron has announced the launch of a new ten-month military service starting in the summer of 2026. The government hopes to mobilise 3,000 people in the first year, rising to 50,000 by 2035. As Christian Renoux of the International Fellowship of Reconciliation explains, this new voluntary military service is intended to replace the Universal National Service (SNU), created by Macron in 2017, which provided for a period of civilian or military training. However, the project proved to be a failure and extremely costly.<\/p>\n \u201cAccording to a survey, 80% of respondents were in favour of the new voluntary service, and 64% were even in favour of reinstating compulsory conscription. But we need to consider the age profile of the respondents. I do not think young people are very interested; in fact, it is difficult to recruit them.\u201d<\/p>\n The debate on conscription is also raging in Italy. Defence Minister Guido Crosetto would like to establish voluntary military service, but the project has yet to be finalised and would need the support of Parliament. Meanwhile, the \u2018Non-Violent Action\u2019 movement has already delivered 7,471 letters from citizens declaring themselves unwilling to \u201ctake up arms\u201d to the Council of Ministers and President Mattarella.<\/p>\n These various forms of opposition have a legal basis at national level, but the right to conscientious objection is also recognised at European level. In a landmark 2011 ruling, the European Court of Human Rights held that opposition to military service is protected by the European Convention on Human Rights.<\/p>\n The situation across the EU<\/strong><\/p>\n As security and defence remain national prerogatives rather than EU competences, recent debates and measures in Germany, France and Italy illustrate how individual EU members are reassessing their military manpower models amid a broader resurgence of the defence agenda. This renewed focus is driven not only by Russia\u2019s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, but also by mounting concerns over the future reliability of transatlantic security guarantees under Trump’s administration. What, then, is\u00a0the overall state of military conscription<\/a>\u00a0across the European Union?<\/p>\n Although all EU countries rely primarily on professional armed forces, roughly one third of member states currently maintain some form of peacetime conscription, with wide variations in service length, remuneration and reserve structures. Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania and Sweden all operate compulsory or semi-compulsory systems. In parallel, Croatia has decided to reinstate mandatory military service, while Germany is introducing a new voluntary military service scheme. In both cases, participation will initially apply only to men and will begin in 2026.<\/p>\n Across the EU, conscription systems broadly fall into three models. Mandatory service, in force in Austria, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland and Greece, requires all eligible citizens to serve, usually through multiple annual call-up cycles. Lottery-based conscription, used in Denmark, Latvia and Lithuania, relies on random selection to determine who is required to serve, alongside a significant number of volunteers. Selective compulsory service, applied in Sweden, enrols individuals based on criteria such as motivation, aptitude, educational background and interest in military service.<\/p>\n At present, only Sweden and Denmark apply conscription to both men and women, reflecting evolving gender norms in defence policy. Service duration also varies considerably, with Austria, Cyprus, Latvia and Lithuania setting fixed terms, while other countries adopting more flexible arrangements. In Finland, for example, conscripts trained for the most demanding or specialised roles can serve for up to 347 days.<\/p>\n However,\u00a0in a landmark 2011 judgment<\/a>, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that opposition to military service, when rooted in a serious and insurmountable conflict with an individual’s conscience or deeply held beliefs, falls within the scope of Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights. All EU Member States with active conscription systems recognise conscientious objection in national law and provide alternative service options, usually civilian or unarmed. While the duration of such service is often intended to be proportional to military service, the European Bureau for Conscientious Objection\u00a0notes notable discrepancies<\/a>, raising concerns over equal treatment in the exercise of this right.<\/p>\n \u201cThis article was produced as part of the Thematic Networks of PULSE, a European initiative that supports transnational journalistic collaborations.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" As EU governments confront security fears and manpower shortages, Kyiv’s experience shows both the necessity and the social limits of mobilisation, making conscription a deeply divisive issue.
\nBy Federico Baccini, Futura D\u2019Aprile, Sofia Nazarenko<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":405816,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"episode_type":"","audio_file":"","podmotor_file_id":"","podmotor_episode_id":"","cover_image":"","cover_image_id":"","duration":"","filesize":"","filesize_raw":"","date_recorded":"","explicit":"","block":"","jnews-multi-image_gallery":[],"jnews_single_post":{"format":"standard","override":[{"template":"1","parallax":"1","fullscreen":"1","layout":"right-sidebar","sidebar":"default-sidebar","second_sidebar":"default-sidebar","sticky_sidebar":"1","share_position":"top","share_float_style":"share-monocrhome","show_featured":"1","show_post_meta":"1","show_post_author":"1","show_post_author_image":"1","show_post_date":"1","post_date_format":"default","post_date_format_custom":"Y\/m\/d","show_post_category":"1","show_post_reading_time":"0","post_reading_time_wpm":"300","post_calculate_word_method":"str_word_count","show_zoom_button":"0","zoom_button_out_step":"2","zoom_button_in_step":"3","show_post_tag":"1","show_prev_next_post":"1","show_popup_post":"1","show_comment_section":"1","number_popup_post":"1","show_author_box":"0","show_post_related":"1","show_inline_post_related":"0"}],"image_override":[{"single_post_thumbnail_size":"crop-500","single_post_gallery_size":"crop-500"}],"trending_post_position":"meta","trending_post_label":"Trending","sponsored_post_label":"Sponsored by","disable_ad":"0","subtitle":""},"jnews_primary_category":[],"jnews_override_counter":{"view_counter_number":"0","share_counter_number":"0","like_counter_number":"0","dislike_counter_number":"0"},"footnotes":""},"categories":[25707,30809],"tags":[32859,30548],"class_list":["post-442780","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-world-politics","category-defence-security","tag-conscription","tag-ukraine-in-2"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.eunews.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/442780","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.eunews.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.eunews.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.eunews.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.eunews.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=442780"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/www.eunews.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/442780\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":442782,"href":"https:\/\/www.eunews.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/442780\/revisions\/442782"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.eunews.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/405816"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.eunews.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=442780"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.eunews.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=442780"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.eunews.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=442780"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}