But Vivaldi is less significant for the territory recovered than for the tactics being used to recover it. The operation is testing<\/a><\/span> how combined-arms manoeuvre might work when persistent surveillance makes traditional force concentration increasingly dangerous.<\/p>\n It is also a story of command-and-control and organised adaptation: bringing new tactics, technologies and battlefield lessons together within a larger operation.<\/p>\n One might even say it is like putting a Lego set together.<\/p>\n The growing role of unmanned ground vehicles offers one indication of the scale of that adaptation. In August, Ukraine\u2019s Ministry of Defence said its forces had conducted more than 100,000 logistics and evacuation missions using UGVs since the beginning of 2026, with monthly use rising steadily.<\/p>\n Number of UGV missions conducted in 2026<\/p>\n When the 3rd Corps assumed responsibility for the sector, it faced Russian forces increasingly relying on small-group infiltration<\/a><\/span>. Rather than concentrating large formations, small infantry teams probed gaps in Ukrainian positions and attempted to establish themselves between or behind defensive positions.<\/p>\n Ukraine\u2019s initial response was not a counter-offensive.<\/p>\n The 3rd Corps first worked<\/a><\/span> to stabilise the front, eliminate infiltration zones, reorganise units and establish a more coherent reconnaissance-and-strike system. Only then did it move towards offensive action.<\/p>\n That sequencing is central to Vivaldi. Rather than using drones only to support an infantry assault, Ukrainian forces first tried to change the conditions under which their infantry would fight.<\/p>\n Russian drone operators were hunted and jammed. Deep-strike drones attacked logistics and supply routes, while Ukrainian forces targeted launch sites, ammunition depots and other infrastructure supporting Russian drone operations.<\/p>\n As 3rd Corps deputy commander Rodion Kudryashov later described<\/a><\/span> it, before soldiers could advance even a few hundred metres, Ukrainian forces first had to reduce Russia\u2019s ability to observe them, attack its logistics and drones, restrict reserves and create the conditions for assault units to move.<\/p>\n UGVs were also pushed into roles traditionally performed by soldiers and crewed vehicles. They have reportedly helped breach minefields, protect infantry and attack Russian positions. In some cases, heavy drones have transported explosive UGVs forward, allowing robotic systems to reach dangerous areas without exposing soldiers to the same risk.<\/p>\n The technologies themselves are not revolutionary. Their integration is<\/a><\/span>.<\/p>\n Vivaldi follows a sequence: suppress enemy surveillance, disrupt logistics, transfer some of the risks of assault to unmanned systems, then commit infantry to manoeuvre.<\/p>\n For a military facing manpower constraints, the logic is clear: wherever possible, put a machine into the most dangerous part of an operation before putting a soldier there.<\/p>\n<\/a><\/span><\/h3>\n
Stabilise before attacking<\/h4>\n
Shape the battlefield first<\/h4>\n
Combined arms is changing<\/h4>\n