Defence: EU totally unprepared for coordination of Armed Forces movement

Brussels – The armed forces of EU member states are still unable to move quickly across borders, according to the findings of a new report by the European Court of Auditors. The latest Union Action Plan on Military Mobility “found mixed progress due to design weaknesses, and
obstacles to implementation remain.” “The goal of moving military staff, equipment, and supplies swiftly and seamlessly within and beyond the EU—at short notice and on a large scale—has not yet been achieved.”

With the return of high-intensity warfare to the European continent, defence priorities have changed, and therefore, the Union intends to prepare for possible future aggression efficiently. Military mobility policy has evolved since the first action plan, published in 2018. For the first time in history, the budget for 2021–2027 has reserved a dedicated budget for dual-use civilian and military transportation infrastructure projects. However, the accounting magistrates note, “the game changer was Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, which turned the bloc’s strategic need for military mobility into a matter of urgency.” Under pressure, the second action plan was published in November 2022.

“Military mobility is crucial to making the EU’s defence capability credible, and there is clearly a need for speed. But it is still not in the fast lane due to bottlenecks along the way,​” said Marek Opioła, a member of the Court responsible for the report.

“Organising military movements may face significant delays for different reasons, such as red tape. For example, tanks from one EU country cannot move through another if they are heavier than road traffic regulations allow. Under normal circumstances, an EU country currently requires 45 days’ notification of cross-border movement authorisations.”

The auditors found that the European Commission had not thoroughly assessed needs in advance when preparing Action Plan 2.0, thus preventing it from making a robust estimate of the funding needed to achieve its objectives.

The total allocation for military mobility for the 2021–2027 period of €1.7 billion “is relatively modest, but member states welcomed it as a step in the right direction. The EU made the funds available quickly, providing an important political signal. However, demand far exceeded supply, meaning that there was no money left in the pot by the end of 2023. The result is a significant gap of over four years before EU funds for military mobility can be made available again, thus hampering the stability and predictability of funding.”

Funds need to be well targeted to have an impact, “but,” the Court notes, “geopolitical and military factors were not taken into account when selecting dual-use infrastructure projects for funding. Moreover, projects were selected in a piecemeal manner, not always taking into account the most strategic areas nor the larger picture.” The funded projects were mainly located in Eastern Europe. Still, the EU funded almost no projects on the southern route to Ukraine. What is more, “the projects were already selected for EU funding before the most urgent priorities were established.”

The governance arrangements for military mobility are complex, fragmented, and have no point of contact. “This,” the Court points out, “makes it difficult to know exactly who does what.” To help the EU make progress, the Court suggests improving these arrangements and the focus of EU intervention, as well as making funding more predictable. To alleviate bottlenecks in military mobility, the EU can also tap the potential of funds currently earmarked for civilian transport.