Exactly five years ago, Ursula von der Leyen was an unknown German politician who had been minister of Labor and then of Defense in a country where, at the time, the army used wooden rifles in drills as it was so ill-equipped. She was well-liked by Angela Merkel, and Emmanuel Macron fell into the trap of the then chancellor because rather than disregarding the spitzenkandidat principle, he unseated Manfred Weber from a role that should have been his as he was the European leader of the EPP and supported the appointment of this lady, on the surface mild and delicate, who turned out to be the same as Merkel; both made out of untempered steel.
Macron was sure to have control over the Commission. Then, five years later, von der Leyen forced him to change the commissioner candidate because he was too strong, and she always had a lousy relationship with him. Thierry Breton is “chummy” with Macron; he has considerable international stature and does not come from the blue. On the other hand, his replacement, the young Stéphane Séjournè, does come out of the blue as no one has ever considered him a man of any political depth, and he has never shown any particular passion for Brussels.
Von der Leyen arrived in Brussels as an almost unknown, taking her first steps in 2019. When Covid broke out in 2020, for the first time, she showed her character and what she was capable of. Basically, after a few weeks, she brought all the governments in line and took over the management of the pandemic. According to most observers, she also did an excellent job. Once the pandemic ended in 2022 the Russian invasion of Ukraine began. Here, her role was less evident, perhaps because NATO also played its part, but she managed in this case as well to line up everyone (or almost everyone) in a solid front of support for Kyiv.
Over the years, in this context, her firm, authoritarian, and centrist character emerged. It became clear that she shared decisions with a few loyalists, keeping many commissioners out of the control room. In short, she was a determined centralizer. She also clashed with Breton and other commissioners on this.
In the 2024 European elections, the leading candidate for the EPP could only be her, the outgoing president of the Commission. And the EPP won the vote.
At which point, von der Leyen had it all, and, this time, in perfect alignment with a newfound alliance with Manfred Weber, she handled it as she wished. She, a right-wing woman, accepted the votes of the Greens for her confirmation, keeping away, apparently, those of the Conservatives because otherwise she would have lost the Socialists and even a part of the Populars.
But then, when she formed her second Commission, everyone’s hands were much more tied because finding a balance is complex, and once found everyone had so much to lose, von der Leyen decided to give a decidedly heavy vice presidency to an ECR member, Raffaele Fitto (even if in fact it will have to be verified how much real influence the Italian member of the college will have). It marked the turning point as 15 members of the European executive are from the EPP, one from the ECR, and one from Patriots for Europe (as an “independent,” but having been a plenipotentiary for Victor Orban in Brussels for years, loyal to the Patriots founder).
In short, the doubt arises that von der Leyen has no small political finesse and that the dissenting vote from the ECR on her confirmation was actually the cover agreed upon in exchange for a heavy vice presidency to get the mandate. Now, it becomes difficult for Socialists, Greens, and a few Popular dissenters to vote against the College. And the College has the shape von der Leyen wanted, as far to the right as possible.
English version by the Translation Service of Withub
