EU’s top leadership, defence, strategic agenda: EU leaders’ summit amid tensions and need for understandings

Brussels – Strategic agenda, defence and its financing, and then the renewal of institutional summits: All sensitive and potentially explosive issues for a European Union that wants to avoid rifts. The summit of heads of state and government is in between the need to move forward and the necessary caution. The meeting scheduled for tomorrow and the day after in Brussels (June 27 and 28) will not be an easy one. The leaders’ summit does not seem to be off to the best of starts, for an agreement on the top jobs, the top EU posts, announced in advance, leaving some leaders, including Council President Giorgia Meloni, out of the negotiating game.

There is discontent in some capitals over an arrangement that, in fact, lands on the table while the games were played elsewhere. But, it’s pointed out in Brussels, the majority rule applies on appointments, and if the parties that think they have a majority—specifically the Populars (EPP), Socialists (SEP), and Liberals (RE)—make a proposal, it is voted on. As some confide, the main political families are pulling straight, even net of a packed agenda, but creating friction over a move seen as a stretch and “a reversal of post-election and inclusive logic” typical of the communitarian spirit. 

Barring surprises, the package of institutional appointments is not expected to blow up, not least because, as is recalled in Bruxelles, Ursula von der Leyen at the head of the EU executive, Antonio Costa for the Council, and Kaja Kallas for the role of High Representative “are the same names that have been in the news for months.” Besides, blowing up the table on one agenda item risks blowing up everything. 

The strategic agenda, with goals for the new five-year period, is definite but not final. It doesn’t quite please everyone, and the Hungarian delegation made no secret about it but is nevertheless willing to discuss it. “We have not received veto warnings from Hungary, but amendments,” stress European sources close to the dossier. These are not casual emphases, which serve to reiterate that there is a desire for results. Other diplomatic sources confirm that “work is being done on amendments” to a text, the strategic agenda, for which unanimity is required, as it is annexed to the summit conclusions.

These must take into account other issues. One is the Middle East, which raises questions about terminologies and formulas yet to be certified. “The situation is complex, and the knot is the language,” to sum it up as done by insiders, who are the same ones ready to bet on a “lively” discussion on defence. In this chapter, also on the agenda, the issues are resources to stimulate industry and the interoperability of different military systems. The Nordic countries are against the idea of common debt instruments to finance security and defence policies, and the Commission—also aided by a von der Leyen still campaigning and hunting for reappointment—has decided to postpone presenting its report containing the various possible options. An oral presentation is planned, representing a way out of a terrain that could have become even more slippery and bumpy than it already is.

Heads of state and government are moving as if walking on eggs. It takes little to break them in the twelve-star basket, but the general awareness is there, which helps to stay on the tracks of technical and political work. It is true, however, that only at the last will it be known what the real order of discussion will be. As a draft program, the strategic agenda should be addressed first and then focus on appointments, but the order could be reversed.

Ultimately, the Twenty-seven should avoid bad figures and close understandings, perhaps not detailed and on which to continue working, but the meeting ahead looks less smooth than budgeted. This is not to say it is impossible, but steady nerves and attention will be needed.