Serbia, pro-Russian President Aleksandar Vučić in Ukraine for the first time

Brussels – A turn of events between the Western Balkans and Ukraine. One of Vladimir Putin‘s main European allies, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, surprisingly attended a summit in Odessa, where he met his Ukrainian counterpart Volodymyr Zelensky in his first official visit to the country. Could this be an attempt to reposition Belgrade on the international chessboard, further away from Moscow and closer to Brussels?

The announcement, released by the Serbian presidency office, came as a surprise to everyone. Aleksandar Vučić travelled to Odessa today (11 June) for a one-day official visit, setting foot in Ukraine for the first time since he came to power in 2012. The authoritarian Balkan leader participated in a summit organised by Kiev that brings together a dozen southeastern European countries.

Among others present in the port city, hit in the past few hours by another Russian bombing, were also the newly elected Romanian president Nicușor Dan, the Moldovan president Maia Sandu, the Greek premier Kyriakos Mitsotakis, and the Croatian premier Andrej Plenković. No invitations, however, for the representatives of Kosovo: probably a gesture of good faith on the Ukrainian side towards Belgrade, which does not recognise Pristina’s independence.

Grateful to all the leaders and partners who came together in Odesa for the Fourth Ukraine–Southeast Europe Summit.@sandumaiamd, @JakovMilatovic, @NicusorDanRO, @avucic, @R_JeliazkovPM, @AndrejPlenkovic, @kmitsotakis, @elisaspiropali, @IzetMexhiti, @tfajon

Your presence sends… pic.twitter.com/Q58VCl0hdK

– Volodymyr Zelenskyy (@ZelenskyyUa) June 11, 2025

According to several observers, the appearance in Odessa should be read as a political signal from the Serbian leader, who is attempting to reposition his country a little further away from Russia and a little closer to the EU. Vučić had so far juggled a complicated balancing act between Moscow and Brussels, which did not seem to have caused him any particular difficulties.

 

One of Vladimir Putin‘s strongest European allies (with whom
he celebrated the 80th anniversary of the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany on 9 May), the Serbian president maintains deep economic, energy, strategic, and cultural-historical ties with the Federation.

 

In order not to alienate the Kremlin, it is trying to remain ‘neutral’ with regard to the war in Ukraine: it has not joined the EU sanctions against Moscow (the 18th package is coming up) and provides humanitarian (but not military) aid to Kyiv, while at UN votes he has repeatedly sided in favour of the territorial integrity of the attacked country, avoiding recognising Crimea and the other partially occupied oblasts’ as de jure Russian territory.

 

Even so, in recent days the relationship between Moscow and Belgrade seems to have suddenly cracked. At the end of May, Russian intelligence accused Serbia of sending arms to Kyiv through triangulations with NATO countries such as Bulgaria, Czechia, and Poland as well as other African intermediaries, going so far as to speak of a ‘backstabbing‘ by the traditional Balkan ally. Serbia, like Russia, is historically opposed to NATO, having suffered its bombing in 1999.

 

 

 

On the other hand, at least on paper, Vučić aims to bring Belgrade into the twelve-star club. But on the path to membership weigh—or have weighed so far —both the increasingly authoritarian management of power on his part (starting with the repression of the oceanic protests that have been rocking the country for months) and the awkward closeness with the Russian tsar, despite António Costa’s and Kaja Kallas’ silence.

Currently, 22 negotiating chapters out of a total of 33 are open and a couple have been provisionally closed, but the process has been in mothballs for a few years. Specifically, the problems would be related to the opening of cluster 3 (inclusive growth), as the Twenty-seven do not consider the rule of law situation satisfactory, including the fight against corruption, the independence of the judiciary, and media freedom.

The truth, at any rate, is that Serbia’s approximation to the EU—in parallel with its distancing from Russia—is in the strategic interest of Brussels. It is probably still too early, however, to say whether we are facing a realignment of Belgrade’s foreign policy, which would entail Vučić’s abandonment of decades-long alliances and without a concrete prospect of membership.