Europe can defend itself against Russia without the US. But it must move now

Brussels – How much does it cost to organise European defence? How long would it take to achieve the necessary efficiency? Could it have the strength to counter a Russian attack? All in all, Europe is less far from being prepared than many alarms would suggest, doing the math right. That’s what emerges from a report published today (Feb. 21) by the Brussels-based think tank Bruegel, which analyzes the type and number of troops and assets that Europe would have to deploy in the event of an effective withdrawal of U.S. forces from the continent.

The threat to face would be a Russia that can count on significant field experience, 700,000 troops mobilized in Ukraine in 2024, and rampant production of advanced weaponry. U.S. analysts and not only have called the possibility of an attack on the EU “conceivable” as early as in the next three to ten years.

Should Ukraine reject a possible Russian-American peace agreement, the report explains, the wisest choice for the Union would be to continue supporting Kyiv. In economic terms, filling the gap left by U.S. aid would involve only an increase in spending equal to 0.12 per cent of the EU GDP. “Since February 2022, U.S. military support to Ukraine has amounted to €64 billion,” Bruegel recalls, “while Europe, including the United Kingdom, has sent €62 billion. In 2024, U.S. military support amounted to €20 billion out of €42 billion. To replace the U.S., the EU would thus only have to spend another 0.12 per cent of its GDP—an affordable figure.”

However, the situation in the prospect of a peace plan accepted by Ukraine would be much more challenging, because it would allow Russia to continue the buildup of its military strength. This would force Europe (United Kingdom and Norway included) to initiate an immediate arms race. According to current NATO doctrine, 200,000 U.S. troops would have to back up the 100,000 European troops already deployed in the event of a Russian attack. Therefore, without the Americans, a force of 300 thousand troops would be necessary, adequately trained and equipped.

In addition to numbers, capacity matters: it would take an all-European unified command capable of coordinating the troops of the 27 (which does not exist to date) but also a force, in terms of armoured vehicles, tanks and artillery, superior to that of today’s ground forces of Germany, France, Italy, and Britain combined, overseen by a common industrial policy. To build a credible deterrent force it would also be necessary to boost war production, which—to cut costs—would have to be substantiated by a European-scale procurement, not a national one.

How much would all this cost? According to Bruegel, European defence spending is expected to rise rapidly to €250 billion annually (3.5 per cent of European GDP, compared to the current 2 per cent). It would have to be paid in debt to boost European economic activity in a period of possible tariff wars. In the short term, the spike in demand could lead to a substantial increase in inflation, but in any case, as order volumes in armaments increase, prices should fall back. European countries closer to the Russian border, which would encounter less opposition from domestic public opinion, could co-finance the effort with the EU through national funds.

Ultimately, the contribution of the German leadership would be the sine qua non of the whole operation: Germany alone is estimated to raise its military spending from €80 to €140 billion.