After the elections: concerned considerations on the future Commission

The post-election picture has been widely discussed in recent days, in this newspaper and everywhere. In two lines, the general comment is that the Parliament has not passed into the hands of the radical right-wingers; however, we are all a bit concerned about what is happening in France and Germany, as well as a very composite European Council table, with more and more Euroskeptic figures. In all of this, however, it seems that the issue of top jobs in the Union can be resolved almost quietly. I still have to see this, but this message is getting through now.

Nevertheless, we have all forgotten—or at least I haven’t seen anyone remember—that the fact that European governments are now so diverse, with more and more cabinets held by forces that are at least eurosceptic, some pro-Russian, some hoping that Donald Trump wins the US elections, will lead to the formation of a European Commission akin to the European Council.

The President is very powerful but still at the head of a commission, in which each component (which is designated by national governments) can say and do its own thing. Or even not do, like, according to many, the outgoing Polish Agriculture Commissioner. In recent years, it has not been uncommon for the Hungarian representative to get in the way, following the line his government implemented in the Council. Of course, the most important posts have been in the hands of people of proven pro-European faith, such as Competition, Economy, or Health.

In the next five years, what will happen? What would happen if the occurrences and emergencies that need to be handled—now unknown and may not even be any new ones—fall within the purview of a Dutch eurosceptic commissioner? or that of a Hungarian pro-Russian?

At least six or seven commissioners (out of 27) will have this profile, and it is still unclear who, in France, in the case of cohabitation, has the power to appoint the representative in the European cabinet.

A Commission with at least a quarter of eurosceptic commissioners is at great risk of gridlocks or, at the very least, slowdowns, regardless of new or old emergencies. In short, the third leg of European power could hold nasty surprises even in “ordinary” work.

So, very well, the presidency is a problem we are being told is solved; even one of the vice-presidencies, that of the high representative, seems to be entrusted to a capable pro-European politician. The problem remains among the other 25.