Brussels – A group of boys, cargo ships with suspicious routes and almost five hundred overflights over German military bases. The spy story is perfect for a Netflix series, with young journalists on one side and a ship to chase through the waters of the North Sea on the other. The protagonists of the story are, in fact, seven students from the Axel Springer School of Journalism in Berlin, aided by professionals from the Bild and Die Welt. Through their research with open sources, they managed to identify 19 temporal and geographical correlations between drone sightings over European military bases and the positions of three ships with links to Russia.
It has to be said right away: they haven’t found the smoking gun, but they have made public a series of information that gives a more complete picture of the suspicious episodes involving northern Europe.
The HAV Dolphin—flagged in Antigua & Barbuda—had been circling in Germany’s Kiel Bay for ten days. Not delivering cargo. Just loitering, 25 kilometers from defense shipyards where drone swarms had been spotted on three separate days. (2/6) pic.twitter.com/c7DMJ1PZ2o
— (@henkvaness) December 11, 2025
The number of unidentified drones
Their investigation began with the German Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) obtaining confidential documents. According to these documents, there were 1,072 incidents involving 1,955 drones in 2025 alone. The swarms of drones flew “almost exclusively over or near military installations.” The numbers give a snapshot of the vulnerability of European airspace. Indeed, the German police were able to identify the drone pilots in only 29 of 498 cases. In the vast majority of cases (85 per cent), however, they were unable to identify the type of drone used to fly over the military bases.
According to the journalists, the difficulty in locating the perpetrator stems from the fact that these aircraft take off from cargo ships. Confirming this thesis is a cross-reference between maritime traffic data off Germany and drone incidents. After a long search, they managed to skim the investigation, bringing the number of ships considered suspicious down to three.
The Hav Dolphin
The most illustrative story is the one about the Hav Dolphin. The Antigua and Barbuda-flagged ship was present at the Pregol shipyard in Kaliningrad from the end of March to the end of April 2025, a facility with documented links to the Russian military and the Russian state atomic energy corporation (Rosatom). According to research by the journalists, the Russian Atomic Energy Agency has drones capable of flying at 140 km/h with a range of 200 km. Officially, these drones are used for surveillance of Arctic sea routes.
Rosatom also operates the Atomflot fleet of nuclear-powered icebreakers. My students found a 2024 Rosatom presentation. It showed an orange-and-blue drone on the helipad of a massive red icebreaker in an Arctic landscape. (6/6) pic.twitter.com/oOxgHy0LMy
— (@henkvaness) December 11, 2025
The Hav Dolphin was considered suspicious because from 1 to 10 May, it remained stationary in Kiel Bay, between Germany and Denmark. Exactly during this period, drones were spotted on three separate days above the defence shipyards, 25 kilometres away.
Not only did the young reporters notice the anomalous presence of the Antigua and Barbuda ship, but the German police searched the Hav Dolphin three times. Each time, nothing was found. However, security sources told the Berlin students that the inspections conducted had been “superficial” and “symbolic in nature.” Not all containers had been opened, and a thorough inspection would have required many more investigators and more time. Although the ship was flying the flag of Antigua and Barbuda, the entire crew was Russian.
The Hav Dolphin, after the May incident, continued to navigate the waters of the North Sea. In early June, a drone was spotted inside the military security zone at a naval radio station between Germany and the Netherlands. The aircraft flew over this space for about two minutes before disappearing. Seventy kilometres away, the suspicious craft had been anchored in the estuary of the Ems for three days.
The Chase
The news of the second episode convinced the boys to chase the ship across the seas of Europe. The cargo vessel was identified in a French port on the Atlantic. The boys thus flew to Paris and then chased it around the coasts of Northern Europe.
Their objective was to have a drone fly over the ship to monitor what was inside it. The flyover took place but failed to photograph any drones or suspicious operations. However, after consulting with the German domestic intelligence agency, the young people managed to glean that, according to the services, “the crew is composed solely of Russians. The suspicion is that they are low-level agents engaged in espionage, sabotage, and other disruptive activities.”
Denials and Suspicions
The elements, in any case, do not close the circle. Petter Kleppan, CEO of Hav Shipping, the Norwegian company that owns Hav Dolphin, denied any accusations: “We only have large, established European companies as customers. We transport dry goods from one port to another: steel, kerbstones, grain, scrap. Typical invoice: around €50,000. We have no Russian customers and generate no turnover from Russia. There is no shortage of inconsistencies, however, and the Berlin journalists brought them to light.
Evidence brought to light
After the five weeks required for the investigation, they were able to prove that ships with Russian crews and with links to Rosatom showed abnormal behaviour near German military installations. The Russian state nuclear company operates drones on cargo ships. European intelligence is aware of these ships and considers them to be in Russia’s service, yet fails to take effective countermeasures.
English version by the Translation Service of Withub
