Georgia and India push Russian oil, EU torn between discontent and embarrassment

Brussels – Russian oil is still being sold, and in no small quantities. Long-standing European partners such as Georgia and newer ones such as India are stocking up on it. These deals are unwelcome in Brussels, where trade flows between Moscow and Tbilisi and between Moscow and New Delhi are annoying the European Parliament and embarrassing the EU Commission. The European Parliament has seen protests from the People’s Party (EPP), Socialists (S&D), Liberals (RE), and Conservatives (ECR), united in condemning Georgia’s import of Russian crude oil, a candidate country for EU membership, with a question  signed by all these parties. The pretext for this concern is a series of press articles, but the problem actually existed before the publications.

Official data from the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (COMTRADE) confirm that since the start of Russia’s war in Ukraine, Georgia has increased the value of its purchases of Russian oil by more than tenfold. Total imports rose from $474,000 in 2022 to $3.6 million in 2023 and $5.8 million in 2024. This is in defiance of EU sanctions and the complete ban on the purchase of crude oil extracted and refined in Russia. The crackdown on Russian oil began as early as May 2022, when Georgia changed its commercial policy and began purchasing more Russian raw materials, with the possibility of reselling them. 

Today, the Parliament would like to see sanctions imposed on Georgia, but Maria Luís Albuquerque, Commissioner for Financial Services, is turning a blind eye and answers: “It is up to the Council to decide unanimously on the modification or new adoption of sanctions.” This is only half the truth, omitting the other part, which involves the College of Commissioners of which Albuquerque is a member: the Council must decide, yes, but on the basis of proposals that must come from the Commission. These proposals do not exist, and Albuquerque does not even mention them. This element is missing from the response, a sign that the EU executive does not know how to deal with a policy, that of Tbilisi, which plays into the hands of Russian President Vladimir Putin.

The EU executive, which has nevertheless invested politically in bringing Georgia closer to the EU, knows that this approach further distances the country from EU membership, which is already effectively on hold, and brings it closer to the Russian Federation’s sphere of influence. The logic of friendships, alliances, and national interests does not exactly paint the European Union in a favourable light, as the case of India demonstrates.

The EU has just signed a trade agreement with India that is useful in terms of countering Donald Trump and thus shielding itself from the aggressive policies of the United States in recent days, but also serves to increase its presence in the BRICS group of countries, the intergovernmental organisation that brings together the major emerging economies and in which Russia plays a significant role and wields considerable influence. Yet India, like Georgia, has also chosen not to align itself with the EU sanctions against Russia. In fact, the Asian country has also increased its purchases of Russian oil, enriching Putin and the coffers of “his” Federation. 

In this case, too, the European Union risks finding Russian oil subject to sanctions in the form of derivative products processed in India and resold abroad.

Once again, the European Commission’s response is stammering: the head of the spokesperson service, Paula Pinho, merely points out that Russian oil is banned and that the EU is working daily to prevent sanctions from being circumvented. However, this response does not dispel fears that Russian crude oil could end up in the EU via third-party retailers.