With the advent of John XXIII to the papal throne, Giovanni Spadolini titled one of his famous editorials “The Wider Tiber” to signify the predictable paradigm shift in the state-church relationship after the long reign of Pius XII.
Unconsciously, Trump took up the concept for himself, declaring that because “a vast ocean” separates the United States from Europe, the Ukrainian conflict is of greater relevance to Europeans than to Americans. This is in line with the hostile attitude Trump has maintained since the beginning of his second presidency and totally at odds with the spirit, if not the letter, of the Atlantic Alliance.
But that’s what it is. And so, after initial confusion, initiatives to deal with Cyclone Trump are multiplying these days, not only because of his substantial adherence to Russian theses on the origin and responsibility of the war in Ukraine and its duration but also because of his ultimate goal of fostering the emergence of “sovereignist” parties and movements that share the watchwords of the new and impetuous American leadership and can replace the current “elites” who have led Europe to its “political and value drift.”
Among the first to move, and at least try to spar without waiting any longer, were Macron and British Prime Minister Starmer, who put on the table the prospect of guaranteeing the deployment of military “peacekeeping” forces on condition that the US continues to guarantee a backstop and that the Europeans are effectively involved in the negotiations for a solution to the conflict, as well as Antonio Costa who patiently wove the threads for the convening of an extraordinary European Council on Thursday, March 6. Credit must be given to Ursula von der Leyen for making the good decision to emphasize EU support for Ukraine by moving the entire Commission to Kyiv on the third anniversary of the Russian invasion for a “mini-summit” with Zelensky in the presence of Pedro Sanchez and other leaders of European countries.
Time is running out: hence the idea, unthinkable just a few months ago, of a joint EU-UK fund for European arms and security-related spending, called by Polish Finance Minister Andrzej Domanski a “rearmament bank,” and which the countries concerned are expected to discuss on the sidelines of the G20 finance ministers’ meeting this week in Cape Town, to set the stage for the meeting of European leaders in London scheduled for Sunday, March 2.
Beyond technicalities, the mere fact that such a joint project is being considered speaks volumes about the willingness to react to the sudden and abrupt turn of events. Starmer, indeed, announced that military spending would increase to 2.5 per cent of GDP by 2027, with the possibility of rising to 3 per cent as early as 2030.
As for the meeting of European leaders on Thursday, March 6, in Brussels, Costa included the possible appointment of an EU special envoy for Ukraine on the agenda, making his own the proposal made at the Munich security conference by Finnish President Alexandre Stubb and by Croatian Prime Minister Andrej Plenkovic.
If, at this delicate and convulsive stage, it were decided to entrust a personality—necessarily a high-level one—with the “cell phone” of the European Union and its member states to speak with one voice about Ukraine’s future with the other parties involved, this would certainly constitute a fundamental step, showing a unity of purpose that has been rather tenuous so far.
The attitude of Germany will be interesting in this regard, in the transient situation in which it finds itself and which, of course, remains at the centre of European politics. Given the Ukraine dossier’s many economic, financial, military, and geopolitical implications, it will also be interesting to see who will be sufficiently authoritative to play such a role.
English version by the Translation Service of Withub
