US rejects ‘Buy European’ in defence procurement, vows retaliation

Brussels – It is not just a trade dispute; it is a real diplomatic warning: the US Departments of State and War have expressed their firm opposition to the ‘Buy European’ strategy that the European Union would like to introduce in the revision of the directive on defence procurement. They wrote this in a comment in the open consultation on the revision of the European directive on defence procurement. Washington does not mince its words: “The United States strongly opposes any changes to the Directive that would limit US industry’s ability to support or otherwise participate in EU member state national defense procurements.” What’s more, if Europe were to continue along this path, the White House’s response would not be long in coming. “If European preference measures were implemented in member states’ national procurement laws, the United States would likely review all existing blanket waivers and exceptions to the Buy American laws provided under or made in association with these our RDPAs,” i.e., the legally binding bilateral reciprocal defence procurement agreements (RDPA) with the United States, signed by 19 EU Member States. In other words, the US considers any protectionist stance by the EU to be “wrong” and warns that, in response to binding clauses, it could review its ‘Buy American’ exemptions, effectively barring EU companies from overseas tenders.

“The United States fully supports European rearmament and a revitalization of the European defense industrial base,” reads the US administration’s comment. “However, these efforts must not weaken the transatlantic defense industrial base, jeopardize our collective ability to deliver equipment to our warfighters, or pose risks to shared economic benefits,” the comment explains. Furthermore, the US considers the push by the EU Commission for European preference “would contradict the EU’s commitments under paragraph 7 of the US-EU Joint Statement on trade, which states the EU commitment to ‘substantially increase procurement of military and defense equipment from the United States’ and ‘deepen transatlantic defense industrial cooperation’.”

For the White House – the same White House that launched the trade tariff policy – “protectionist and exclusionary policies that strong-arm American companies out of the market when Europe’s largest defense firms continue to greatly benefit from market access in the United States are the wrong course of action.” Furthermore, European preference “European preference in the Directive would undermine European rearmament and weaken NATO interoperability and readiness,” would “run counter” to the EU-US agreement on tariffs reached in July, and conflict with the principle that “defence remains primarily a national competence,” the Pentagon states in its comment.

The American Chamber of Commerce has also expressed its opinion on the matter, albeit in more measured tones. The US’s objective is indeed to support the EU defense plan to strengthen the European Union’s military capacity by 2030 (Readiness 2030), but always alongside the United States. “The emphasis on strategic autonomy and potential European preference mechanisms, if not designed in a rigorous and transparent manner, could openly or inadvertently discourage participation and investment by trusted non-EU partners. This would risk reducing competition, limiting access to cutting-edge technologies, and weakening, rather than strengthening, the overall industrial resilience of allies in defence at a time when transatlantic collaboration is crucial.”

Washington’s statement comes just a few days before the presentation (scheduled for 26 February, but still to be confirmed) of Ursula von der Leyen‘s plan to relaunch European industry, the Industrial Accelerator Act – a central element of the Clean Industrial Deal – which could contain a ‘Buy European’ clause for procurement in strategic sectors. Meanwhile, the EU has already introduced European content criteria into the SAFE programme, the 150 billion euro programme for loans to EU countries, and into the 90 billion euro loan to Ukraine: in both cases, at least 65 per cent of the value of the equipment must come from Europe.

This is not the first time that the United States has threatened retaliation for EU decisions affecting the European single market. A similar game is also being played with digital rules. Last summer, the US president threatened the Digital Services Act (DSA), the Digital Markets Act (DMA), and the taxation of large web companies. There were more pressures in the autumn. More recently, the Trump administration published a 160-page document – also revealing the names of EU officials involved in this work – which accuses the European Union of “censoring” the internet, on the one hand, renewing US pressure on EU policies and, on the other, rekindling transatlantic tensions.