The EU is prepared to take drastic measures to prevent a new migration crisis from the Middle East

Brussels – Last week, following the European Parliament’s adoption of the regulation on returns, the European Union has put all the pieces in place for its new crackdown on irregular immigration: alongside the Pact on Migration and Asylum, which will come fully into force next June, the first EU list of safe countries of origin and the broadening of the definition of a safe third country will allow member states to severely restrict the right to asylum. Now the focus of EU leaders is entirely on the possible consequences of the conflict triggered by Israel and the United States in the Middle East, and the imperative is to avoid a repeat of 2015 and the migration crisis that engulfed the continent. 

In the conclusions of the European Council meeting on 19 March, the heads of state and government of the 27 member states included a paragraph on migration in the section dedicated to the Middle East crisis: “Although the conflict has not given rise to immediate migration flows towards the European Union—the document states—the EU stands ready to fully mobilise its diplomatic, legal, operational, and financial instruments to prevent uncontrolled migration flows towards the EU and to preserve security in Europe.” And this “on the basis of the policy instruments the EU has developed in recent years”, but above all “the lessons learnt from the 2015 migration crisis and to avoid a similar situation”. 

That year, fuelled by the war against Daesh in Syria and Iraq, more than a million people seeking international protection arrived at the EU’s borders, placing the 12-star club’s asylum system under severe strain. In a decision of historic significance, the then German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, opened Germany’s doors to 800,000 Syrian refugees. Ten years on, it is in Berlin that the European Union’s new approach to migration is most clearly evident, driven by the need to curb the more or less widespread rise of far-right parties across the continent. 

Just yesterday, the German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, leader of the same CDU party to which Merkel once belonged, called on Syrians living in Germany to “return home.” Speaking on the sidelines of a meeting with the Syrian president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, Merz stated that “looking beyond the next three years”, the aim is for “around 80 per cent of Syrians currently living in Germany to return home.” Regardless of its feasibility—since the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, only a few thousand Syrian citizens have voluntarily returned to Damascus—the plan reveals a shift in mindset away from the “wir schaffen das” (“we can do it”, a phrase uttered by Merkel in 2015). 

Whilst the Return Regulation paves the way for the establishment of detention centres in third countries to which irregular migrants who have been ordered to leave the territory of a Member State can be deported, the Regulations on the management of asylum and migration (RAMM) and on asylum procedures (APR),  provided for in the Migration and Asylum Pact, will allow for the intensification of border procedures for processing asylum applications. Alongside the list of safe countries of origin (which currently includes Bangladesh, Colombia, Egypt, India, Kosovo, Morocco, and Tunisia, but suggests that all countries with an asylum recognition rate of less than 20 per cent should be treated as safe) and the revision of the concept of a safe third country, the Pact on Migration and Asylum will facilitate the use of accelerated procedures. 

One of the most controversial aspects of the Pact is the Regulation on crises, exploitation, and force majeure, which deals with situations involving an exceptional or unexpected “mass influx of people”: in such a scenario, derogations from the general migration and asylum management system will be triggered, with the recognition rate threshold for admitting people to border procedures (set at 20 per cent under the APR Regulation) rising to 50 per cent in situations of force majeure, to 60–70 per cent in crisis situations, and to 100 per cent in cases of exploitation. 

When it is not possible to stem the flow of arrivals through agreements with countries of origin and transit (see Tunisia), the explicit aim is, in all cases, to reduce the number of people being received as much as possible. The European Commission continues to assure us that this new framework “will help Member States process asylum applications more efficiently, in full respect of the EU’s fundamental values and rights.” But an initial test of its effectiveness—and of its impact on respect for migrants’ human rights—is likely to be just around the corner.

 According to figures released by the UNHCR as early as mid-March, due to Israeli and US airstrikes in Iran, around “3.2 million people are currently internally displaced” within the country. This figure is “set to rise as hostilities continue.” Meanwhile, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) has recorded the displacement of over 130,000 people from Lebanon, affected by the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, to Syria. According to the Lebanese authorities, there are already over one million internally displaced persons in the country. 

Even if only a fraction of these figures were to result in asylum applications within the EU, it is by no means certain that the system would hold up or that Member States would be able to balance the responsibilities and solidarity required by the Pact on Migration and Asylum. Given the further hardening of policies and the narrative surrounding migration, it is more likely that countries of first arrival will seek to take cover and secure agreements with third countries in the wake of the Italy-Albania protocol. Certainly, in a crisis scenario, the European Union would be forced to drop the mask which—with increasing difficulty and embarrassment—it continues to wear: that of respect for the values it has set for itself and for people’s fundamental rights.